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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
WEIS, Circuit Judge, 
 
The district court denied a request for intervention by 
local governmental bodies and business concerns in 
litigation brought by environmentalists to restrict logging 
activities in a National Forest. We conclude that the 
proposed intervenors established a threat to their interests 
from the suit and a reasonable doubt whether the 
government agency would adequately represent those 
concerns. Accordingly, we reverse the district court's order 
and remand for further proceedings. 
 
Plaintiffs are six Pennsylvania and Ohio residents and an 
Indiana organization committed to environmental 
preservation. They filed suit against the United States 
Forest Service ("Service") asserting that the agency had 
violated statutory requirements in approving two projects 
that permitted substantial tree cutting in the Allegheny 
National Forest. Plaintiffs requested an injunction barring 
implementation of the proposed measures, halting all 
logging activity, and suspending or canceling contracts for 
logging in the forest. In addition, plaintiffs sought a 
declaration that approval of the projects was arbitrary, 
capricious, and not in conformity with the law. 
 
Through the National Forest Management Act of 1976, 
Congress authorized the Secretary of Agriculture to develop 
land and resource plans that are used as a guide to all 
resource activities in a national forest, including timber 
harvesting. See 16 U.S.C. S 1604. The process is described 
in some depth in Ohio Forestry Association v. Sierra Club, 
118 S.Ct. 1665 (1998) and need not be detailed here. The 
statute also imposes procedural obligations on the 
Secretary to ensure that environmental interests will be 
considered in the plan. 
 
In 1997, the Service, as the Secretary's designee, 
approved the Minister Watershed Project and the South 
Branch Willow Creek Project, both covering areas within 
the Allegheny National Forest in Northwestern 
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Pennsylvania. The projects called for substantial tree 
harvesting through "even-aged management." This process, 
in general terms, contemplates clearing designated areas of 
all trees, rather than focusing on individual trees within the 
given tract, the latter being far more costly and time- 
consuming for timber companies. See 36 C.F.R. S 219.3; 
see also Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792, 795, 798-800 
(5th Cir. 1994) (discussing the technique and Congressional 
approval at some length). In launching the projects, the 
Service concluded that they were consistent with the 
resource plan and would not create a significant 
environmental impact within the forest. 
 
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the projects violate 
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 
S 4332, because of the lack of an environmental impact 
statement and, among other things, the failure to consider 
more environmentally-protective alternatives. The complaint 
also alleges several violations of the National Forest 
Management Act, including an objection to even-aged 
management and the "landscape corridor approach," which 
endorses the even-aged timber-cutting philosophy. 
 
A motion for leave to intervene was filed by a number of 
area school districts located near the Allegheny National 
Forest, including Ridgway, Bradford, Kane, Johnsonburg, 
and Smethport. In addition, six townships--Cherry Grove, 
Hamilton, Hamlin, Highland, Wetmore, and Jones--sought 
intervention. 
 
The school districts and municipalities asserted an 
interest in the suit because they receive funds from receipts 
of logging operations in the forest. By statute, the federal 
government disburses twenty-five percent of the gross 
amounts received from the forest to the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania at the end of each fiscal year. 16 U.S.C. 
S 500. In turn, the Commonwealth forwards these sums to 
counties where the forest is situated, which then pass the 
money on to local municipalities and school districts for the 
benefit of public schools and roads. 72 Pa.C.S.A. 
SS 3541-3543. During the ten years preceding the filing of 
this suit, the federal government disbursed, on average, in 
excess of $4 million per year to the Commonwealth. 
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Elimination of logging contracts would deprive the localities 
of this resource. 
 
Joining the motion for leave to intervene were Brookville 
Wood Products, Inc., Northeast Hardwoods, Ridgway 
Lumber Co., Payne Forest Products, Inc., Spilka Wood 
Products Co., and Allegheny Hardwood Utilization Group, 
Inc. Payne and Spilka have existing contracts to cut timber 
as part of the Minister Watershed Project. Ridgway was the 
successful bidder on a contract under the South Branch 
Willow Creek Project, but the Service has withheld 
awarding the contract pending the outcome of this 
litigation. Brookville Wood Products and Northeast 
Hardwoods are also lumber companies that generate most 
of their income from contracts with the Service. Allegheny 
Hardwood is a nonprofit corporation whose members hold 
existing sales contracts with the Service and expect to bid 
on future timber sales contracts that would be affected by 
this litigation. 
 
The district court reviewed the prerequisites for 
intervention as set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
24(a)(2) and denied the motion as to all applicants except 
Payne and Spilka. In those two instances, the court 
determined that intervention was justified because existing 
contract rights would be threatened if plaintiffs prevailed. 
 
The court observed that the other applicants had 
interests of "an economic nature based on expectation." 
Although those "interests are very important, the court is 
compelled to conclude based on the case law that they are 
not the type of protectable interests that justify intervention 
as of right under Rule 24(a)(2)." The court also denied 
permissive intervention under Rule 24(b)(2). All of the 
unsuccessful applicants have appealed. 
 
I. 
 
During the pendency of this appeal, the district court 
entered summary judgment for defendants on most claims 
asserted by plaintiffs with respect to the two projects 
because of the failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
The district court is presently considering whether claims 
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challenging the landscape corridor approach as a 
management philosophy should suffer a similar fate. 
 
Plaintiffs have secured a certification under Federal Rule 
of Civil Procedure 54(b) and are appealing the adverse 
district court ruling. Because that order and any future 
adverse action on the remaining claim might be reversed by 
this Court or the Supreme Court, the applicants' ability to 
participate remains a viable issue. This appeal 
consequently is not moot. Mausolf v. Babbitt, 85 F.3d 1295, 
1297 (8th Cir. 1996); United States Postal Serv. v. Brennan, 
579 F.2d 188, 190 n.1 (2d Cir. 1978). 
 
II. 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24 provides in pertinent 
part: 
 
       "(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely  application 
       anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action . . . 
       (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating  to 
       the property or transaction which is the subject of the 
       action and the applicant is so situated that the 
       disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
       impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
       interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
       represented by existing parties." 
 
We have interpreted Rule 24(a)(2) to require proof of four 
elements from the applicant seeking intervention as of 
right: first, a timely application for leave to intervene; 
second, a sufficient interest in the litigation; third, a threat 
that the interest will be impaired or affected, as a practical 
matter, by the disposition of the action; and fourth, 
inadequate representation of the prospective intervenor's 
interest by existing parties to the litigation. Mountain Top 
Condo. Ass'n. v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, Inc., 72 F.3d 
361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 1995); Development Fin. Corp. v. Alpha 
Hous. & Health Care, Inc., 54 F.3d 156, 161-62 (3d Cir. 
1995); United States v. Alcan Alum., Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 
1181 (3d Cir. 1994); Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1115 
(3d Cir. 1992); Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 596 (3d 
Cir. 1987). 
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We will reverse a district court's determination on a 
motion to intervene as of right if the court has abused its 
discretion by applying an improper legal standard or 
reaching a conclusion we are confident is incorrect. Harris, 
820 F.2d at 597. The parties to this appeal do not dispute 
the timeliness of the motion for leave to intervene, so we 
move on to consider the other elements. 
 
To justify intervention as of right, the applicant must 
have an interest "relating to the property or transaction 
which is the subject of the action" that is "significantly 
protectable." Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 531 
(1971). That observation, however, has not led to a"precise 
and authoritative definition" of the interest that satisfies 
Rule 24(a)(2). Mountain Top Condo., 72 F.3d at 366; see 
also Conservation Law Found. v. Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 
41 (1st Cir. 1992) ("no bright line of demarcation exists"). 
Some courts treat the "interest" test as a pragmatic process 
that qualifies as many concerned parties as is compatible 
with efficiency. Others reject interests that are 
"speculative." Often the determination of whether an 
interest is significantly protectable is "colored to some 
extent" by the "practical impairment" inquiry. Conservation 
Law Found., 966 F.2d at 41-42. 
 
The nebulous nature of the standard is apparent from 
our precedents. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Industries 
Corp., 387 F.2d 939, 941 (3d Cir. 1968), held that in a 
declaratory judgment action over the commercial 
reasonableness of the sale price of collateral, a "would-be 
purchaser" did not have an adequate interest for 
intervention. On the other hand, in EEOC v. AT&T, 506 
F.2d 735, 741-42 (3d Cir. 1974), a union was permitted to 
intervene to contest a proposed consent decree between the 
government and an employer that could have affected the 
terms of a collective bargaining agreement. 
 
In Harris, the court denied intervention to a district 
attorney in a suit brought to alleviate overcrowding and 
other conditions in the local penal institution. We observed 
that the district attorney did not administer the prison and 
that a consent decree placing a ceiling on the prison 
population would only tangentially affect his ability to 
prosecute. 820 F.2d at 599-603. By contrast, Alcan 
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Aluminum held that an adequate interest for intervention 
had been established where a right of contribution for 
expenses incurred in cleaning up a hazardous waste site 
could have been jeopardized by a proposed consent decree. 
25 F.3d at 1183-86. 
 
Brody involved a suit to enjoin religious speech. A group 
of students and parents sought to intervene in opposition 
to plaintiffs. We concluded that the proposed intervenors 
had no interest in litigating the merits of the school's 
policies, but to the extent a remedy fashioned in a decree 
might infringe on their First Amendment rights, the parents 
and students could be eligible for participation in the suit. 
957 F.2d at 1116-17. We also commented on "our policy 
preference which, as a matter of judicial economy, favors 
intervention over subsequent collateral attacks." Id. at 
1123. 
 
In Alpha Housing, the sole member of a nonprofit 
corporation sought to intervene to protect the continued 
viability and tax exempt status of the corporation. We 
accepted the plaintiffs' concession that these interests were 
significant enough to support intervention. 54 F.3d at 162. 
Finally, in Mountain Top Condominium, we concluded that 
the intervenors' interest in the disposition of a specific fund 
was sufficient to justify intervention even though they could 
not challenge the merits of another party's claim to the 
fund. 72 F.3d at 367-68. 
 
This brief review of our jurisprudence does not yield a 
pattern that will easily support or defeat intervention in all 
circumstances. Rather, the variety of factual situations and 
their resolution demonstrate our adherence to the elasticity 
that Rule 24 contemplates when compared to the rigidity of 
earlier practice. See Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso 
Natural Gas Co., 386 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1967). 
 
A leading treatise explains that pragmatism is a 
substantial factor that must be considered: "The central 
purpose of the 1966 amendment was to allow intervention 
by those who might be practically disadvantaged by the 
disposition of the action and to repudiate the view, [under 
the former rule], that intervention must be limited to those 
who would be legally bound as a matter of res judicata." 7C 
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Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 
2d S 1908, at 301 (1986). 
 
Phraseology such as "mere economic interests," for 
example, has been used but has not proved decisive in 
practice,1 nor have concepts such as "mere expectancies" or 
"indefiniteness" been particularly helpful in identifying the 
nature of the interest required. We have more often relied 
on pragmatic considerations such as the benefits derived 
from consolidation of disputes into one proceeding. Those 
considerations, however, should not prevail if the focus of 
the litigation would be unduly dissipated or case 
management would become exceptionally complex. 
 
Our survey of the law in other Circuits, particularly as 
applied in environmental litigation, provides some helpful 
background. In Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202 (5th Cir. 
1994), the case upon which the district court principally 
relied, plaintiffs challenged certain management practices of 
the Service in Texas forests. The Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit concluded that two trade groups whose 
members included the "major purchasers and processors" 
of timber had an interest sufficient to satisfy Rule 24(a). Id. 
at 1207. In that case, some member companies had 
interests in existing timber contracts. Id. 
 
In Sierra Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d 106 (5th Cir. 1996) 
(per curiam), a trade association representing farmers 
sought intervention in a suit to cut off federal subsidies to 
those who pumped water from an aquifer. Plaintiffs 
contended that over-pumping threatened endangered 
species and public health. The court concluded that the 
suit "potentially" interfered with the intervenors' contract 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. That phrase and others like it were mentioned in Mountain Top 
Condominium, 72 F.3d at 366, and Alcan Aluminum, 25 F.3d at 1185. 
The concept was explored in New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. United 
Gas Pipe Line Co., 732 F.2d 452, 464-66, 470 (5th Cir. 1984) (en banc). 
The issue in NOPSI was the remoteness of the interest of the city as a 
regulatory agency in a breach of contract suit brought by a public utility 
against one of its gas suppliers. It was not the fact that the city's 
interest 
was financial in nature that disqualified it, but rather, because its 
interest was too attenuated from that of the utility. Id. The city failed 
to 
show that it possessed any interest recognized by substantive law. 
 
                                9 
  
rights by disrupting their access to irrigation water. Id. at 
109. 
 
Similarly, intervention was permitted by the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit in Conservation Law 
Foundation, where plaintiffs and a government agency 
agreed on a consent decree that set timetables for the 
establishment of a government plan that would impair the 
business of commercial fisheries. As targets of a regulatory 
plan ultimately aimed at reducing over-fishing, the 
commercial fisheries alleged an interest that supported 
intervention. 966 F.2d at 43-44. 
 
Some decisions, however, adopt a more mechanical 
approach when evaluating the relevant interests. In 
Portland Audubon Society v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302 (9th Cir. 
1989), for example, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit held that an economic interest in protecting a 
continuous supply of timber was insufficient to warrant 
intervention in a NEPA case by a trade group and various 
timber companies. Following Wade v. Goldschmidt, 673 
F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), Portland Audubon 
held that in a suit to compel an agency to follow NEPA, only 
governmental bodies may be defendants. Id. at 309; see 
also Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest 
Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1499 n.11 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Sierra 
Club v. EPA, 995 F.2d 1478, 1485 (9th Cir. 1993)); cf. Collin 
County v. Homeowners Assoc. for Values Essential to 
Neighborhoods (HAVEN), 915 F.2d 167, 170-72 (5th Cir. 
1990) (plaintiffs lacked standing to sue for a judgment 
declaring governmental compliance with NEPA). But cf. 
Mountain States Legal Found. v. Glickman, 92 F.3d 1228, 
1232-33, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (lumber company has 
standing to sue the Service under the National Forest 
Management Act and challenge its decision to limit timber 
harvesting). 
 
These cases seem to suggest that NEPA suits are sui 
generis because "only the government" can comply with 
that statute. We are reluctant to endorse a narrow 
approach that makes the onus of compliance the litmus 
test for intervention. Such a wooden standard minimizes 
the flexibility and spirit of Rule 24 as interpreted in 
Cascade Natural Gas. See Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207 
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(permitting timber industry organization to intervene as a 
defendant in a NEPA case against the Service). 
 
The reality is that NEPA cases frequently pit private, 
state, and federal interests against each other. Rigid rules 
in such cases contravene a major premise of intervention-- 
the protection of third parties affected by pending litigation. 
Evenhandedness is of paramount importance. See  Note, 
Sierra Club v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: 
Intervention of Right and the Victories that Come Back to 
Haunt, 7 Tul. Envtl. L.J. 271, 283 (1993). 
 
The expansion of standing by statute and case law has 
enabled "private attorneys general" and "public interest" 
groups to call governmental agencies to task in litigation. 
These efforts, though often well-intentioned, sometimes 
concentrate on narrow issues that are of significant 
concern to plaintiffs but have an immediate and deleterious 
effect on other individuals and entities. Rather than barring 
access to these parties, Rule 24 allows the court to give 
them the opportunity to present their positions. 
 
Thus, we are reluctant to accept the holdings of the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Portland Audubon 
and Sierra Club v. EPA that, in reliance on Wade, seem to 
adopt a categorical rule in NEPA cases barring private 
support for governmental agencies. Wade did not espouse 
such a rigid position. In that case, the Court denied 
intervention to various municipalities and private parties 
that would have benefitted from a highway project because 
their interests were not directly implicated by the lawsuit. 
The Court cautioned, however, that a different case would 
be presented if the suit would "directly alter contractual or 
other legally protectable rights of the proposed intervenors." 
673 F.2d at 186 n.6. 
 
The Ninth Circuit inched away from the doctrinaire 
approach in Forest Conservation Council by allowing non- 
federal parties to intervene in a NEPA case, but limited 
their participation to the remedy phase. 66 F.3d at 1499 & 
n.11. Some of our cases, particularly Harris and Brody, 
have endorsed a bifurcated approach in some 
circumstances. We explored the viability of that form of 
relief with counsel at oral argument, but neither they nor 
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we have been able to arrive at a pragmatic application of 
that option here without unduly attenuating the applicants' 
interests. 
 
The convergence of conservation and timber interests 
that has occurred in this case confirms that the categorical 
approach can be too inflexible. Protecting timber interests 
has been an express Congressional policy since the 
establishment of the national forest system through the 
Organic Administration Act of 1897. 16 U.S.C. S 475. That 
policy was affirmed in the Multiple-Use Sustained-Yield Act 
of 1960, 16 U.S.C. SS 528-31, and reaffirmed in the 
National Forest Management Act of 1976. 16 U.S.C.S 1604. 
The National Forest Management Act also blends logging 
and environmental interests by requiring land management 
plans to be drafted "under the principles of the Multiple- 
Use Sustained-Yield Act" and "in accordance with" NEPA. 
16 U.S.C. S 1604(g)(1). 
 
Under these circumstances, we think that the decision of 
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit in Sierra Club v. 
Espy represents a more realistic approach in permitting 
intervention. Timber companies have direct and substantial 
interests in a lawsuit aimed at halting logging or, at a 
minimum, reducing the efficiency of their method of timber- 
cutting. 
 
Adequacy of interest alone, however, is not enough to 
grant intervention. Because Rule 24(a) envisions a separate 
inquiry into whether the government or other existing 
parties will adequately advocate the applicant's interest, 
courts must be careful not to blur the interest and 
representation factors together. See e.g., Solid Waste 
Agency v. United States Army Corps of Engineers, 101 F.3d 
503, 508 (7th Cir. 1996) (in suit to compel issuance of a 
permit to allow establishment of a landfill, adjacent 
municipality and citizens group could intervene to defend 
the Corps' denial; "stumbling block" would be"proving 
inadequacy of representation" by the government). 
 
The burden of establishing inadequacy of representation 
by existing parties varies with each case. A government 
entity charged by law with representing a national policy is 
presumed adequate for the task, Brody, 957 F.2d at 1123, 
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particularly when the concerns of the proposed intervenor, 
e.g., a "public interest" group, closely parallel those of the 
public agency. In that circumstance, the "would-be 
intervenor [must make] a strong showing of inadequate 
representation." Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303. But the 
presumption notwithstanding, when an agency's views are 
necessarily colored by its view of the public welfare rather 
than the more parochial views of a proposed intervenor 
whose interest is personal to it, the burden is comparatively 
light. Conservation Law Found., 966 F.2d at 44; accord 
Mausolf, 85 F.3d at 1303 ("when the proposed intervenors' 
concern is not a matter of `sovereign interest,' there is no 
reason to think the government will represent it"); see also 
Solid Waste Agency, 101 F.3d at 508-09 (raising concerns 
that workload of Solicitor General's Office could prevent an 
agency's appeal and thus adversely affect proposed 
intervenors). 
 
This overview demonstrates that Rule 24 demands 
flexibility when dealing with the myriad situations in which 
claims for intervention arise. Nonetheless, the polestar for 
evaluating a claim for intervention is always whether the 
proposed intervenor's interest is direct or remote. Due 
regard for efficient conduct of the litigation requires that 
intervenors should have an interest that is specific to them, 
is capable of definition, and will be directly affected in a 
substantially concrete fashion by the relief sought. The 
interest may not be remote or attenuated. The facts assume 
overwhelming importance in each decision. 
 
Counseled by these appellate opinions, we assess the 
case before us. The relief sought by plaintiffs, i.e., an 
injunction to bar logging (at least until such time as the 
NEPA process is completed) would have an immediate, 
adverse financial effect on the school districts and 
municipalities. That result is not speculative, intangible or 
unmeasurable, especially when, as other courts have 
observed, NEPA compliance actions can take years. See, 
e.g., Forest Conservation Council, 66 F.3d at 1498. 
 
The school districts and municipalities have direct 
interests in this litigation because state law commands the 
Commonwealth, through its political subdivisions, to 
forward to them federal grant money generated through 
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timber harvesting each year, money that they will lose, at 
least temporarily and perhaps permanently, if plaintiffs are 
successful in this lawsuit. To suspend the flow of revenue 
to the school districts and municipalities for even a limited 
period of time would affect spending for essential school 
activities and public projects. We are persuaded that the 
interests jeopardized, which are protected by state law, are 
direct, substantial and of adequate public interest as to 
justify intervention. In these sparsely populated areas with 
limited tax bases, the impairment caused by curtailing 
revenue provided through logging activity would be 
significant. 
 
Turning to the private-party applicants, the district court 
cited Sierra Club v. Espy for the proposition that only those 
timber companies with existing contracts had an interest 
that would support intervention. From our point of view, 
Sierra Club v. Espy states a rule of inclusion for evaluating 
interests under Rule 24(a)(2), but should not be read to 
exclude similar, contract-related interests of the type 
implicated here. 
 
Ridgway Lumber had more than a mere expectancy of 
obtaining a contract in the future. It was already a 
successful bidder, and from all that appears in the record, 
would now be a party to a remunerative contract for logging 
but for the institution of this litigation. Realistically, 
Ridgway has as strong an economic stake in the outcome of 
this litigation as do Spilka and Payne, which were 
permitted to intervene. 
 
Brookville Wood Products and Northeast Hardwoods may 
not have received contracts under the projects challenged 
by plaintiffs, but the district court found that they are "very 
dependent on timber contracts with the [Service] to cut 
timber" in the Forest and "their continued existence may be 
jeopardized" if plaintiffs prevail. Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. In 
addition, like the other timber companies, they have a 
considerable stake in ensuring that the landscape corridor 
approach to forest management remains in place. Congress 
has designated our national forests for multiple uses, but it 
has also emphasized that those uses are "not in derogation 
of" timber harvesting. 16 U.S.C. S 528. This statement of 
policy, when viewed in light of the district court's finding 
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that a victory for plaintiffs could destroy their business, 
satisfies us that Brookville and Northeast Hardwoods have 
a substantial interest, directly related to and threatened by 
this litigation, that meets the requirements of Rule 24(a). 
 
Allegheny Hardwood falls within the category of those 
trade associations representing threatened businesses 
granted intervention in such cases as Sierra Club v. 
Glickman, 82 F.3d at 108, Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d at 
1203, and Conservation Law Foundation, 966 F.2d at 40. 
We find the rulings in those cases persuasive and 
applicable to Allegheny Hardwood. 
 
Therefore, we conclude that the interests of the private- 
party applicants are direct, not remote. In other words, they 
have more than mere attenuated economic interests 
because, as we have outlined, their longstanding 
dependence on contractual relations with the Service is 
unique to them. 
 
Although plaintiffs assert that the proposed intervenors' 
interests are adequately protected by the government 
defendant, the district court found otherwise with respect 
to Payne and Spilka. The court pointed out that in a 
companion case, Curry v. United States Forest Service, 988 
F. Supp. 541 (W.D. Pa. 1997), the agency chose not to 
appeal an adverse ruling in connection with timber sales in 
other projects in the Allegheny National Forest. 
Consequently, that litigation gave legitimate pause to the 
lumber companies' confidence in adequate representation 
by the Service. 
 
In addition, the government represents numerous 
complex and conflicting interests in matters of this nature. 
The straightforward business interests asserted by 
intervenors here may become lost in the thicket of 
sometimes inconsistent governmental policies. See Sierra 
Club v. Glickman, 82 F.3d at 110; Forest Conservation 
Council, 66 F.3d at 1499; Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d at 
1207-08; Conservation Law Found., 966 F.2d at 44-45. 
Although it is unlikely that the intervenors' economic 
interest will change, it is not realistic to assume that the 
agency's programs will remain static or unaffected by 
unanticipated policy shifts. 
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Plaintiffs contend that whatever the doubts about the 
vigor of the government's representation, Payne and 
Spilka's interests are aligned with those of the proposed 
intervenors. We disagree. It does not strain the imagination 
to conjure up situations in which Payne and Spilka may 
face the irresistible temptation to work out settlements that 
benefit themselves and not the other, competing timber 
companies. Compromises of that nature might also harm 
the school districts and municipalities, which have interests 
inextricably intertwined with, but distinct from, those of the 
timber companies. See Lake Investors Dev. Group, Inc. v. 
Egidi Dev. Group, 715 F.2d 1256, 1261 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 
In Solid Waste Agency, the Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit discussed the value of a "wait and see" 
approach in which proposed intervenors would file a 
conditional application with the understanding that the 
district court would defer consideration until requested to 
do so. 101 F.3d at 508-09. Such a procedure may work in 
some cases, but on balance, intervenors and the public 
interest in efficient handling of litigation are better served 
by prompt action on a intervention motion. See 
Conservation Law Found., 966 F.2d at 44 ("An intervenor 
need only show that representation may be inadequate, not 
that it is inadequate."). The early presence of intervenors 
may serve to prevent errors from creeping into the 
proceedings, clarify some issues, and perhaps contribute to 
an amicable settlement. Postponing intervention in the 
name of efficiency until after the original parties have 
forged an agreement or have litigated some issues may, in 
fact, encourage collateral attack and foster inefficiency. In 
other words, the game may already be lost by the time the 
intervenors get to bat in the late innings. 
 
III. 
 
We conclude that in the circumstances of this case, the 
motion for leave to intervene should have been granted. 
Each applicant has a significantly protectable interest in 
the transaction that may be jeopardized by the lawsuit. 
None of the existing parties will adequately represent their 
interests. Although there are a number of intervenors, we 
are confident that the very able district judge will effectively 
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handle any case-management problems that may arise. 
Accordingly, we will reverse the order denying intervention 
and remand the case to the district court for further 
proceedings consistent with this Opinion.2  
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. In light of our holding that the applicants should have been granted 
leave to intervene as of right under Rule 24(a), we need not decide 
whether the district court should have granted permissive intervention 
under Rule 24(b). 
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BECKER, Chief Judge, Concurring. 
 
Although I believe the question to be close as to the 
intervention of Brookville Wood Products, Inc. and 
Northeast Hardwoods, I agree with the majority that the 
district court should have granted the request of the 
appellants to intervene as of right, hence I concur in the 
judgment. I fear, however, that the majority's analytic 
framework departs from the doctrinal view that this Court 
has taken of Rule 24(a)(2), will create mischief in this area, 
and will open intervention as of right to an amorphous "I 
know it when I see it" approach. I therefore write separately 
to set forth my view of the correct governing principles. 
 
I. 
 
Contemporary litigation--particularly environmental 
litigation--frequently affects numerous individuals, groups, 
communities, and business interests, including those not 
originally made party to the litigation. The question often 
arises, as in this case, whether any of these outsiders has 
a right to intervene and to be made a party to the case. 
Plaintiffs have requested an injunction halting all logging 
activities in the Allegheny National Forest ("ANF"), canceling 
all existing contracts for logging in the Forest, and 
preventing the United States Forest Service from entering 
into new contracts. The Forest Service is a party to 
contracts with certain logging companies and, if not 
prevented by the present litigation, would enter into 
contracts with other companies for logging in the ANF. The 
proceeds from these contracts redound not only to the 
benefit of the federal government, but also, pursuant to 
federal and state law, to the benefit of the local school 
districts and municipalities in which the ANF is located. 
Should the requested injunction issue, not only will logging 
jobs be lost and municipal tax revenues from workers' 
incomes and company profits be reduced, but negative 
economic effects also would be felt by logging supply 
companies and even by other local businesses (food 
establishments, real estate developers, etc.). The issue 
before us is whether the district court erred when it 
concluded that, of all of these individuals and groups, only 
two logging companies with existing contracts with the 
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Forest Service met the requirements for intervention as of 
right pursuant to Rule 24(a)(2).1 
 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) provides that: 
 
       (a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely app lication 
       anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an action:. . . 
       (2) when the applicant claims an interest relating  to 
       the property or transaction which is the subject of the 
       action and the applicant is so situated that the 
       disposition of the action may as a practical matter 
       impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect that 
       interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately 
       represented by existing parties. 
 
As the majority notes, we have required proof of four 
elements for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2): (1)  a timely 
application; (2) sufficient interest in the liti gation; (3) which 
might be impaired, as a practical matter, by disposition of 
the action; and (4) inadequate representation of t he 
applicant's interest by existing parties to the litigation. See 
Mountain Top Condo. Ass'n v. Dave Stabbert Master Builder, 
Inc., 72 F.3d 361, 365-66 (3d Cir. 1995). A district court's 
denial of intervention as of right will be reversed only if the 
court has abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal 
standard or reaching a conclusion we are confident is 
incorrect. See Harris v. Pernsley, 820 F.2d 592, 597 (3d Cir. 
1987). 
 
One prominent source has suggested that the inquiry 
under Rule 24(a)(2) must be "flexible," with a"balancing 
and blending" of the individual elements, and that "[t]he 
criteria should be considered together rather than 
discretely." 6 James Wm. Moore, Moore's Federal Practice 
S 24.03[1][b] (3d ed. 1998). The majority appears to adopt 
such a "flexible" and "blending" approach to Rule 24(a)(2), 
endorsing what it sees as the Rule's "elasticity," Maj. Op. at 
8, and calling for "pragmatic considerations" when 
evaluating a petition for intervention. Maj. Op. at 9. I 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Because I conclude that the appellants are entitled to intervention as 
of right under Rule 24(a)(2), I agree with the majority that we need not 
reach the question of whether they are entitled to permissive intervention 
under Rule 24(b)(2). 
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acknowledge, with my colleagues in the majority, that 
"pragmatic considerations such as the benefits derived from 
consolidation of disputes into one proceeding," id., are 
relevant in the Rule 24(a)(2) analysis, and that excessive 
rigidity is neither desirable nor likely what the rulemakers 
intended in adopting the amended Rule 24 in 1966. I fear, 
however, that the majority has taken the pragmatism that 
the 1966 amendments introduced to Rule 24 too far--well 
past the intentions of the Rule's framers, and past any 
recognizable standard to guide trial courts when faced, as 
they frequently are, with petitions for intervention by 
parties with varying degrees of interest in the litigation 
before the court. I also am concerned that this"blending" 
approach opens the intervention door to parties with a 
minor interest or a small likelihood of impairment--as long 
as they can make up for the shortfall in one element with 
strength in another. More importantly, I do not believe that 
the text of the Rule will support the majority's gloss. 
 
II. 
 
The most difficult question in many intervention cases, 
and I believe in this one as well, is the nature of the 
proposed intervenors' interest and whether this interest is 
sufficient to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2).2 The 
starting point for this analysis must be Donaldson v. United 
States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). In Donaldson, the Supreme 
Court held that the interest under Rule 24(a)(2) must be 
one that is "significantly protectable." Id. at 531. Although 
the Supreme Court has failed to provide further guidance 
as to the meaning of this phrase, we have decided a 
number of cases in which the nature of the necessary 
interest has been explored. In my opinion, the majority errs 
in viewing these precedents as creating a "nebulous" 
standard. Maj. Op. at 7. 
 
In Harris, supra, we said that a would-be intervenor 
"must demonstrate that there is a tangible threat to a 
legally cognizable interest." Harris, 820 F.2d at 601. In 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Like the majority, I do not discuss the timeliness requirement, as no 
party to this appeal contests the timeliness of the proposed intervenors' 
petition. 
 
                                20 
  
Mountain Top, supra, we held that "a mere economic 
interest" is insufficient. 72 F.3d at 366. While these cases 
do not give us a bright-line standard, they do flesh out the 
contours of the doctrine. They reduce the analysis to a two- 
part inquiry, i.e., we must examine (1) the reality of the 
interest--does the litigation pose a "tangible threat" to the 
applicant or simply a speculative one?--and (2)  the nature 
of the interest, e.g., is it a "mere economic interest"? We 
have found an interest insufficient when a party's status 
was simply "would-be purchaser" of collateral, see Old 
Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 387 F.2d 939, 941 
(3d Cir. 1968), or when a district attorney's ability to 
prosecute cases would not be directly affected by a prison 
consent decree, see Harris, 820 F.2d at 599-603. In 
contrast, we have found a sufficient interest when a 
proposed consent decree directly impinged on an existing 
contractual right, see EEOC v. AT&T, 506 F.2d 735, 741-42 
(3d Cir. 1974), or on a statutory right of contribution, see 
United States v. Alcan Aluminum, Inc., 25 F.3d 1174, 
1183-86 (3d Cir. 1994). As these cases demonstrate, when 
the interest at issue is both real and legally cognizable 
(through contract, statute, or a property right), we have 
found it to meet the requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) and 
Donaldson. See also Brody v. Spang, 957 F.2d 1108, 1117 
(3d Cir. 1992) (finding an interest sufficient when a consent 
decree altered "legal rights and responsibilities of the 
applicants for intervention"). 
 
Other courts have distinguished interests sufficient 
under Rule 24(a)(2) from those not sufficient for 
intervention as of right in a similar manner. In Scotts Valley 
Band of Pomo Indians v. United States, Indian bands 
brought suit against the federal government to restore the 
trust status of certain land. See 921 F.2d 924 (9th Cir. 
1990). The Ninth Circuit concluded that the City of Chico 
had an interest sufficient for intervention because the 
litigation could result in the removal of certain property 
from the city's tax rolls and from under its regulatory 
purview. See id. at 927-28. In contrast, the Second Circuit 
found the interest of proposed intervenors to be too 
speculative in a case in which plaintiffs sought to force the 
Environmental Protection Agency to promulgate new air 
quality standards. See American Lung Ass'n v. Reilly, 962 
 
                                21 
  
F.2d 258 (2d Cir. 1992). There, although the proposed 
intervenors, electric utilities and trade associations, had an 
interest in the regulations themselves, the plaintiffs did not 
seek to enjoin any activities in which the utilities had a 
direct interest and therefore the utilities had no legally 
cognizable interest that would be altered by the litigation 
itself. See id. at 261. 
 
In similar situations, other courts have found a sufficient 
interest for intervention because the proposed intervenors 
would be directly affected by the litigation seeking changes 
in federal agency rulemaking. See, e.g., Sierra Club v. 
Glickman, 82 F.3d 106, 109 (5th Cir. 1996) (farm group had 
sufficient interest in suit which sought to prevent 
government agency from expending funds to, or fulfilling 
contracts with, farmers); Sierra Club v. Espy, 18 F.3d 1202, 
1207 (5th Cir. 1994) (timber purchasing companies with 
existing contracts had legally cognizable interest sufficient 
to intervene in challenge by environmental groups to Forest 
Service policies regarding logging procedures); Sierra Club v. 
United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 995 F.2d 1478, 1482 
(9th Cir. 1993) [U.S. EPA] (relief sought by plaintiffs would 
directly impinge on intervenor-city's existing permit rights 
under Clean Water Act); Conservation Law Found. v. 
Mosbacher, 966 F.2d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 1992) (Weis, J.) 
(consent decree requiring promulgation of new fishing plan 
would directly affect intervening fishing groups because it 
would require not only a new plan but specifically a plan to 
reduce overfishing).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. I note that, while I agree with the majority that it would be 
inappropriate to adopt a categorical rule that non-governmental bodies 
cannot intervene in NEPA cases, I believe that the Ninth Circuit has 
clarified its holding in Portland Audubon that "governmental bodies 
charged with compliance can be the only defendants" in a NEPA action. 
Portland Audubon Soc'y v. Hodel, 866 F.2d 302, 309 (9th Cir. 1989) 
(internal quotations omitted). In U.S. EPA, supra, as well as in more 
recent cases, the Ninth Circuit has explained its holding in Portland 
Audubon as simply requiring that the intervenor have some interest 
protected by statute, contract, or property rights other than the 
statutory 
scheme of NEPA itself, which by its terms only applies to the federal 
government. U.S. EPA, 995 F.2d at 1483-84. In Portland Audubon, the 
proposed intervenors' interest "appears to have been an economic 
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III. 
 
I turn to applying the foregoing analytic framework (and 
case law) to the parties seeking intervention in this case. 
While my approach differs from the majority's, it leads to 
the same conclusion, that all potential intervenors have a 
sufficient interest for intervention as of right. Two proposed 
intervenors, Payne Forest Products, Inc. and Spilka Wood 
Products Company, have existing contracts with the Forest 
Service which could be suspended or canceled as a result 
of the present litigation. There can be no doubt that 
interference with existing contractual rights constitutes the 
necessary "tangible threat to a legally cognizable interest" 
that we have required for intervention as of right. Allegheny 
Hardwood, the trade association, also represents lumber 
companies with existing contracts, see Dist. Ct. Op. at 6, 
and therefore, as a representative of these companies, has 
a legally cognizable interest which will be directly affected 
by the present litigation. See, e.g., Espy, 18 F.3d at 1207 
(existing timber contracts of member companies give trade 
association "legally protectable property interests" 
necessary to satisfy intervention as of right). 
 
Ridgway Lumber Company, while without an existing 
lumber contract, had successfully bid on one and would 
have entered into a contract with the Forest Service absent 
the present litigation. Its successful bid is a tangible 
interest which could be--indeed, has been--directly affected 
by the present litigation, whatever its eventual outcome. 
See, e.g., Forest Conservation Council v. United States Forest 
Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 1494 (9th Cir. 1995) (when suit has 
"direct, immediate, and harmful effects" on third party's 
legally protectable interests, this satisfies the "interest" 
prong of Rule 24(a)(2)). 
 
A more difficult case is presented with respect to 
proposed intervenors Brookville Wood Products, Inc. and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
interest based upon a bare expectation, not anything in the nature of 
real or personal property, contracts, or permits." U.S. EPA, 995 F.2d at 
1482; see also id. at 1485 ("The loggers in Portland Audubon had an 
interest in securing timber, but no existing legal right to it . . . ." 
(emphasis added)). 
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Northeast Hardwoods. Neither of these companies has an 
existing contract for cutting timber in the ANF, nor have 
they successfully bid on a contract which would have been 
consummated but for the present litigation. However, the 
district court found that these companies "generate the 
majority of their revenues from timber contracts with the 
[Forest Service] to cut timber in the Allegheny National 
Forest" and that they "are very dependent on[these] timber 
contracts." Dist. Ct. Op. at 5. I understand thisfinding, in 
light of the record, to mean that these companies have 
consistently been successful bidders in ANF logging 
contracts, that it is only an accident of timing that they do 
not have contracts at this juncture, and that--particularly 
given the remoteness of the area in which the companies 
operate--they are very likely to secure contracts in the near 
future if logging contracts are there to be bid (which will 
depend on the outcome of this litigation). In evaluating the 
interest of the companies without existing contracts, it is 
apparent that it is not an "actual" interest, but neither is it 
speculative. Under these circumstances, I cannot say that 
the majority is wrong when it finds that these companies 
also have the sufficient interest to meet our requirements 
for intervention as of right. 
 
Finally, the government intervenors have an actual, 
direct interest in this litigation by virtue of their statutory 
right to a portion of the proceeds from contracts between 
logging companies and the Forest Service. The local 
governments are effectively limited partners with the named 
defendant in this case, having no control over the formation 
of the logging contracts but a vested right to a portion of 
the proceeds therefrom. Without this piggybacking on the 
named defendants, I would question whether the 
municipalities have a sufficient interest to intervene, solely 
based on their loss of revenue from reduced tax receipts. 
The majority is not clear about this distinction, 
emphasizing the "limited tax bases," Maj. Op. at 14, of the 
municipalities in question. In my view, it is only the 
statutory right to logging proceeds that gives the 
municipalities here a sufficient interest to intervene and to 
protect that interest from interference that could arise from 
this litigation. 
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IV. 
 
As noted above, the majority does not clearly draw the 
line between interests sufficient for intervention under Rule 
24(a)(2) and those not sufficient. To better illustrate where 
I believe this line is drawn, I consider the proposed 
intervention of hypothetical parties to the present case. The 
logging companies to whom we grant intervention today 
purchase supplies from other companies for the products 
they need to carry out their timber-cutting business. If the 
logging companies' contracts with the Forest Service are 
suspended or canceled, the supply companies could suffer 
a loss of business as the logging companies no longer need 
purchase supplies for timber-cutting. In addition, the 
logging companies employ workers who use their wages to 
purchase products and services in local establishments, 
such as gas stations, grocery stores, etc. Assume one of 
these establishments is a diner frequented by logging 
company employees. When the logging companies' 
contracts with the Forest Service are disrupted by this 
litigation, these employees may be laid off or their wages 
reduced. With less income, they might gather at the diner 
with less frequency. The diner clearly will suffer an 
economic harm, formally (if not directly) caused by the 
present litigation. The same would be true of local 
municipalities if they did not have the statutory right to a 
portion of the logging contract proceeds; they too would 
suffer an economic harm caused indirectly by the present 
litigation. 
 
If the logging supply companies or the local diner were to 
petition for intervention as of right, should the district court 
find their interest sufficient to warrant intervention under 
Rule 24(a)(2)? I believe the majority's "elastic" approach at 
once gives the district court little guidance in answering 
this question, and gives it license to do whatever it wants. 
In contrast, I think it is clear that neither the Rule nor our 
prior jurisprudence in this area would permit the supply 
company or the diner to intervene as of right. While both of 
these businesses likely will suffer an economic harm from 
the litigation, in terms of both the nature and the reality of 
the interest, this harm is both too contingent and too 
remote from the litigation itself to be a legally cognizable 
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interest sufficient for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). See, 
e.g., City of Stilwell v. Ozarks Rural Elec. Coop. Corp., 79 
F.3d 1038, 1042 (10th Cir. 1996) (supplier of electrical 
power to defendant had insufficient interest for intervention 
even though it would "benefit financially if[defendant] is 
allowed to continue to service its customers"). 
 
Unlike the logging companies and the local governments, 
which suffer an immediate, direct harm when the logging 
contracts are suspended--even if they somehow can replace 
their canceled contracts or lost revenue from some other 
source--the diner and supply company suffer any loss only 
down the line, after the logging companies have reduced 
their workers' wages or stopped ordering logging supplies. 
See, e.g., Montana v. United States Envtl. Protection Agency, 
137 F.3d 1135, 1142 (9th Cir. 1998) (potential effect on 
property values from promulgation of new water quality 
standards is "a speculative and purely economic interest 
[which] does not create a protectable interest in litigation 
concerning a statute that regulates environmental, not 
economic, interests"). Further, such losses that the diner or 
supply company may suffer are not grounded in a legal 
right--contractual, property, or statutory--which is related 
to the litigation at hand. See, e.g., Forest Conservation 
Council v. United States Forest Serv., 66 F.3d 1489, 
1495-97 (9th Cir. 1995) (only "tangible, concrete rights 
protected by" statute or contract constitute a sufficient 
interest under Rule 24(a)(2); purely economic injuries, 
pecuniary losses, or frustrated financial expectations are 
not sufficient interests).4 
 
In a different context--the interpretation of the nation's 
antitrust laws--the Supreme Court has distinguished 
between parties injured by direct actions of an antitrust 
violator and those injured down the line (i.e., purchasers 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The same analysis holds for municipalities without a piggyback right 
who may suffer losses when the citizens (lumber company employees) or 
businesses (logging companies, supply companies, local establishments) 
within their communities have less income and pay fewer taxes. Unlike 
the actual municipalities and school districts at issue here, local 
governments without a direct statutory right to a share of the proceeds 
from logging contracts have neither the tangible interest nor the direct 
link to the litigation necessary for intervention under Rule 24(a)(2). 
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from the directly injured parties). See Illinois Brick Co. v. 
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977). In Illinois Brick, the Court 
reasoned that "allowing indirect purchasers to recover 
using pass-on theories . . . would transform treble-damages 
actions into massive multiparty litigations involving many 
levels of distribution and including large classes of ultimate 
consumers remote from the defendant." Id. at 740. Despite 
Rule 24's pragmatic underpinnings, the concern the Court 
expressed in Illinois Brick is instructive in the present 
context. Environmental litigation of the present type could 
potentially involve multiple layers of plaintiffs and 
defendants. The indirect effects from the alleged 
wrongdoing by the federal agency, as well as the collateral 
effects from the litigation itself, touch the lives of residents 
of the communities near the forests, visitors to the area, 
local businesses, municipalities and school districts, 
logging companies and their employees and suppliers, 
consumers of wood and paper products, transportation 
companies which have contracts to move the timber to 
mills, and so on. As in Illinois Brick, some line must be 
drawn lest these environmental cases (and other public law 
cases) become "massive multiparty litigations." We can-- 
and should--draw this line without sacrificing the 
pragmatism of Rule 24. 
 
V. 
 
Once we have established that a party has a sufficient 
interest for intervention as of right, we must determine 
whether "the disposition of the action may as a practical 
matter impair or impede the applicant's ability to protect 
that interest." Fed. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). I note again that the 
majority fails to treat the interest prong and the impairment 
prong as separate requirements. The Rule, however, 
requires both a sufficient interest and that this interest 
might be impaired by disposition of the action in the party's 
absence. Therefore, I believe that the analysis, while 
remaining flexible and pragmatic, must be performed in 
such a manner as to ensure that intervention as of right is 
granted only to those parties meeting both requirements. 
 
In the present case, it is clear that this litigation itself 
could practically impair the interests of all of the proposed 
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intervenors if the district court were to grant the injunctive 
relief sought by the plaintiffs pending a decision on the 
underlying dispute. See Appellees' Brief at 3 ("[T]he initial 
result of success in the litigation below will be a pause in 
timber cutting with regard to the two projects and in other 
areas of the [ANF] . . . ."). The logging companies' interest 
is in contracts to cut timber, either existing or certain to be 
entered into in the near future (absent the litigation). An 
injunction that suspends, cancels, or prevents future 
contracting by the Forest Service will directly and 
immediately affect this interest.5 Similarly, the local 
governments would immediately lose the income to which 
they are entitled from these contracts. 
 
The only hope of preventing impairment would be if the 
proposed intervenors filed their own suit and argued that 
the Forest Service has acted in compliance with the 
relevant statutes and that, therefore, no injunction should 
issue. However, a contrary determination in the present 
case would have a stare decisis effect on this potential 
future litigation, leaving the proposed intervenors without 
legal recourse to protect their interests. As we said in 
Brody, supra, the practical impairment prong is satisfied if 
a judgment 
 
       will have a significant stare decisis effect on 
       [applicants'] claims, or if the applicants' rights may be 
       affected by a proposed remedy. 
 
       An applicant need not, however, prove that he or she 
       would be barred from bringing a later action or that 
       intervention constitutes the only possible avenue of 
       relief. The possibility of a subsequent collateral attack 
       does not preclude an applicant from demonstrating that 
       his or her interests would be impaired should 
       intervention be denied. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. This is not a case like ManaSota-88, Inc. v. Tidwell, 896 F.2d 1318 
(11th Cir. 1990), in which proposed intervenors could not point to any 
direct effect from the relief sought by plaintiff-environmental groups--
the 
promulgation of new regulations by a federal agency--as it was "purely 
a matter of speculation" whether the proposed intervenors would be in 
violation of any new regulations, thereby increasing their costs of 
compliance. Id. at 1322. 
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957 F.2d at 1123 (citations omitted). All of the proposed 
intervenors meet this requirement in the present case.6 
 
VI. 
 
In sum, I believe that an increasingly clear, ifflexible, 
standard has developed in our Rule 24(a)(2) case law, which 
we should adhere to in this case and in future intervention 
situations, and which requires a searching analysis of each 
of the elements required for intervention as of right. I also 
believe that this jurisprudence, while not necessarily 
followed in the majority opinion, leads to the same result. 
I therefore concur in the judgment granting intervention to 
all of the proposed intervenors. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. I agree with the majority that the Service's interests do not 
necessarily 
coincide with the logging companies and that, given the minimal 
standard for finding that an applicant's interests are not adequately 
represented, see Trbovich v. United Mine Workers , 404 U.S. 528, 538 
n.10 (1972), all of the logging companies--and the local governments-- 
meet this final requirement for intervention. 
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